2.1 THE CONCEPT OF CRIME
Criminal law directly affects daily human life more than any other legal branch, yet defining “crime” remains challenging because legal standards dynamically shift across different eras, cultures, and governance models.
A society’s definition of a criminal act or omission is shaped by its political structure, economic framework, religious beliefs, and socio-ethical values; for instance, property rights differ vastly between capitalist and socialist systems, just as social freedoms vary between liberal and conservative societies.
Because criminal law exists to safeguard evolving socio-ethical norms, legislative bodies continuously alter statute books—criminalizing once-accepted practices like polygamy, dowry, and untouchability, while decriminalizing former offences such as suicide, abortion, and adultery as societal values modernize.
2.1.1 As a Public Wrong
In examining the legal classification of crime as a “public wrong,” jurists like Sir William Blackstone and James Fitzjames Stephen sought to frame criminal acts around their broader injury to society.
Blackstone’s initial definition—violating a public law forbidding or commanding an act—proved either overly restrictive by limiting crime to state offences or overly broad by encompassing civil and municipal wrongs.
In response, Blackstone and Stephen redefined crime as a violation of public rights and duties affecting the entire community.
However, legal scholars criticize these definitions for failing to account for criminal liability arising from illegal omissions (such as parental neglect or a police officer failing to prevent torture) and statutory crimes that do not infringe on individual rights, such as counterfeiting.
2.1.2 As a Moral Wrong
Rooted in the Greek “krimo” and Sanskrit “krama”—signifying acts that breach social order—crime was historically analyzed by criminologists like Raffaele Garofalo as an immoral and anti-social act offending collective moral sensibilities.
However, framing crime strictly as a “moral wrong” is legally flawed, as penal codes are designed for governance rather than enforcing personal ethics.
As highlighted by Lord Macaulay and the drafters of the Indian Penal Code, many morally abhorrent behaviors, such as extreme hard-heartedness or gross ingratitude, fall outside the scope of criminal law due to enforcement impracticability, whereas comparatively minor or survival-driven actions like petty theft remain punishable.
Furthermore, modern criminal jurisprudence encompasses numerous statutory, regulatory, and economic offences—such as traffic violations, tax fraud, black-marketeering, and prophylactic possession laws—which exist strictly to maintain socio-economic order and administrative efficiency rather than to punish moral turpitude.
2.1.3 As a Conventional Wrong
Under the concept of crime as a “conventional wrong,” prominent criminologist Edwin Sutherland asserts that criminal behavior is strictly defined by any conduct that violates enacted criminal law.
Regardless of how immoral, indecent, or harmful an act may be, it cannot be classified or punished as a crime unless explicitly banned by legal authority.
Sutherland conventionally defines criminal law as a set of human conduct rules promulgated by political authorities, applied uniformly across society, and backed by state-administered punishment.
Consequently, he identifies four essential characteristics that separate criminal law from other social norms: politicality, specificity, uniformity, and penal sanction.
Critics note, however, that Sutherland’s formulation offers a general enumeration of legal traits rather than a comprehensive conceptual definition, ultimately resulting in the circular statement that a crime is simply anything that violates criminal law.
2.1.4 As a Social Wrong
In response to the limitations of purely legal definitions within developing social science, sociologist John Gillin framed crime as a “social wrong,” defining it as an act that is demonstrably harmful to society—or believed to be harmful by a group holding sufficient power to penalize it.
However, this sociological perspective encounters flaws when explaining criminal behavior, as a legislative shift in an act’s legal status changes only its technical classification, leaving its underlying nature and broader societal reactions largely unaltered.
This gap between statutory codification and social reality is clearly illustrated by anti-dowry legislation: despite formal criminalization, social attitudes toward dowry have remained largely resistant to change, as evidenced by the continued occurrence of dowry deaths and bride burning.
2.1.5 As a Procedural Wrong
Viewing crime as a “procedural wrong,” jurists like John Austin defined crimes by whether the sovereign state or a private victim initiates legal action.
When Austin’s model proved flawed due to offences requiring private victim complaints—such as historical provisions under Sections 497 and 498 of the IPC—Courtney Kenny redefined crimes as punitive wrongs remissible exclusively by the Crown.
However, Kenny’s definition also breaks down because statutory frameworks allow compoundable offences to be settled privately by victims.
Scholars such as Russell and Roscoe Pound emphasize that a permanent definition of crime is impossible because criminal policy reflects evolving social conditions, judicial discretion, and political authority.
Consequently, statutory codes like the Indian Penal Code avoid theoretical definitions entirely, with Section 40 merely defining an “offence” as anything made punishable by law.
Ultimately, a crime is best understood through three practical attributes: a harmful human commission or omission, state-administered penal sanctions to prevent it, and formal legal proceedings to determine guilt.
2.2 THEORIES OF CRIME: NATURAL LAW VIS-À-VIS POSITIVE LAW
From a conventional legal perspective, crime is defined as the performance of acts forbidden by penal legislation, with offenders recognized as those who commit these prohibited deeds.
This foundational premise has generated extensive scholarly work covering crime volume, criminal motivation, crime prevention and suppression, as well as the procedures for apprehending, prosecuting, and rehabilitating criminals.
From a philosophical standpoint, however, the central inquiry centers on whether crime should be defined through the lens of Natural Law (divine or universal moral principles) or Positive Law (man-made statutory codes)—raising the fundamental question of whether crime is ultimately God-made or man-made.
2.2.1 Natural Law
The evolution of criminal jurisprudence reflects an ongoing, 500-year ideological interplay between Natural Law and Positive Law.
Natural Law posits that crime is an inherent violation of nature’s order and basic moral codes, asserting that acts like murder or mutilation are intrinsically wrong regardless of human enactment; however, its reliance on subjective moral feeling plagues it with vagueness and unpredictability.
Conversely, Positive Law views crime as a purely man-made construct—a violation of a sovereign’s command—offering clarity, predictability, and uniform application across diverse societies by defining crimes and punishments explicitly in advance.
Yet, Positive Law faces profound criticism regarding unjust statutes, such as the Nuremberg laws of Nazi Germany, where sovereign commands strip away fundamental human rights.
In modern legal practice, while Positive Law provides the primary operational framework for statutory criminal codes, Natural Law continues to serve as an essential moral compass.
In jurisdictions like England, courts historically recognized common law crimes based on moral outrage, whereas in countries like India and the United States, Natural Law principles function as the “conscience” of statutory codes, enabling courts to interpret legislation flexibly and restrain state excesses.
2.3 TRUE CRIME IDENTIFIED
Under legal philosophy, “true crime” is defined as conduct that is inherently evil and fundamentally disruptive to human coexistence.
It consists of intentional invasions of primary personal rights—requiring both a physical act and a deliberate mental state, such as firing a weapon with the explicit intent to kill.
By excluding acts that result from accident, mistake, coercion, provocation, or mental irrationality, true crime maintains its specific identity as behavior deeply abhorrent to moral sentiment.
Ultimately, true crimes encompass invasions of primary individual rights, interference with public protection agencies, and morally repugnant conduct penalized by positive law.
In contrast, regulatory offenses and victimless crimes merely infringe upon secondary rights, rendering them criminal only in a technical or conventional sense.