Superimposition of Photograph of Deceased
As settled by the 5-judge Supreme Court bench in Ram Lochan Ahir v. State of West Bengal, forensic superimposition—merging a transparent photograph of a deceased person taken while alive over a photograph of a recovered skull—is legally admissible under Section 7 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam to establish identity.
The Court clarified that superimposition is not a trick photograph or a distortion of reality, but rather a valid scientific comparison technique where two authentic photographs are aligned at the same scale to verify structural, anatomical correspondence such as curves, facial angles, and bony prominences.
Coupled with Section 27 disclosure statements leading to the recovery of human remains and personal effects, superimposition serves as key identification proof, alongside general evidence under Section 7 that establishes the underlying relationships and transactions between the parties involved.
Section 8. Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design
Section 8 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam establishes that once reasonable grounds exist to believe two or more individuals have conspired to commit an offense or actionable wrong, anything said, done, or written by any co-conspirator in furtherance of their common intention is a relevant fact against all participants.
Rooted in the law of agency, this provision ensures that acts or communications executed by any member—regardless of whether individual conspirators are complete strangers, ignorant of each other’s specific actions, or joined/left at different times—are fully admissible to prove both the existence of the overarching conspiracy and an individual’s complicity in it.
State of Maharashtra v. Damu Gopinath Shinde
As illustrated in State of Maharashtra v. Damu Gopinath Shinde, once reasonable grounds are established indicating that multiple accused individuals conspired to commit heinous offenses such as child abduction and murder, their mutual conversations and dialogues regarding their common intention become fully relevant and admissible under Section 8 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam.
Such communications can be proved through any permitted legal mode, and once a confession is legally established and admitted, it serves as a valid judicial tool to uncover and evaluate everything said, done, or written among the co-conspirators in furtherance of their criminal design.
Conspiracy Defined.
As outlined under Section 8 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam and Section 61(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, a criminal conspiracy is legally defined as an agreement between two or more persons to accomplish an illegal act or to achieve a legal act through illegal means, encompassing both criminal offenses and civil wrongs.
However, the law draws a crucial line regarding individual culpability: mere awareness or knowledge that a conspiracy exists among others is legally insufficient to make someone a conspirator.
To establish active participation and guilt, there must be a genuine meeting of minds and a shared “consent of will and endeavour” between the parties involved.
Scope of Section.
Under Section 8 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, acts, statements, or writings by any co-conspirator regarding their common intention are admissible against all participants to prove both the existence of the conspiracy and individual membership, creating a vital exception to the general rule that statements bind only the maker.
However, this vicarious admissibility is strictly governed by temporal and substantive limitations: only acts or statements occurring after the inception of the common design and specifically in furtherance of it are relevant, while prior actions are excluded.
Furthermore, before invoking Section 8, the prosecution must establish reasonable grounds showing an active conspiracy exists, and courts strictly bar post-arrest statements of an accused as well as confessional statements of deceased co-conspirators from being utilized under this framework.
Analysis of Section 8.
Section 8 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam is strictly conditional upon establishing prima facie evidence and reasonable grounds that a conspiracy exists among two or more persons before acts or statements made by any participant can be used mutually against others.
This framework dictates that once a conspiracy is initially shown, declarations made after the formation of the common intent are admissible against all members—regardless of whether they joined late, left early, or are complete strangers to one another—though such evidence can be utilized strictly against the conspirators and never in their favor.
Furthermore, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ammani and Others v. State of Kerala, valid foundational proof of a conspiracy allows a confession made by one accused to be used against co-accused parties, with the vital caveat that if subsequent trial evidence completely displaces the initial prima facie proof of the conspiracy, the court must reject the evidence previously admitted.
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) v. V.C. Shukla & Others (Hawala Case)
As demonstrated in Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) v. V.C. Shukla & Others, establishing a widespread conspiracy requires substantive proof rather than mere inferences drawn from social acquaintanceship or occasional formal visits between individuals, meaning Section 8 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam cannot be invoked to establish guilt where the evidence fails to prove a unified criminal design.
Furthermore, the law maintains a strict boundary: anything said, done, or written by a co-conspirator is admissible against others only when it directly relates to and furthers the common intention of the conspiracy, ensuring that any actions or writings detached from their shared criminal objective carry no evidentiary value against co-accused parties.
Emperor v. V. Ganesh Raghunath Vaishampayan
As established by the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. V. Ganesh Raghunath Vaishampayan, once reasonable grounds are established proving the existence of a criminal conspiracy, anything done or said by any participant in furtherance of their common intention is admissible against all co-conspirators.
However, the statutory requirement of “common intention” strictly limits admissibility to forward-looking acts, plans, and statements intended for the future.
Consequently, narratives or statements made by conspirators regarding their past acts cannot be construed as relating to their common intention, and are therefore inadmissible under Section 8 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam.
Badri Rai v. State of Bihar
Under Section 8 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, the agency principle dictates that once a conspiracy is established, the act of one co-conspirator becomes the legal act of all.
As illustrated in Badri Rai v. State of Bihar, where two individuals initially met a police officer to negotiate hushing up a case, a subsequent act and statement by one conspirator delivering the bribe money on behalf of the other was held fully admissible against both to prove agency and the existence of the criminal enterprise.
Furthermore, regarding temporal boundaries, while acts occurring prior to the initial formation of the common intention or after the total termination of the conspiracy are excluded, the Supreme Court in Ram Narayan Popli and K. Hashim v. State of Tamil Nadu clarified that acts performed by co-conspirators before a specific member joined or after they departed remain admissible against that member, provided the acts occurred within the active lifespan of the overarching conspiracy.
State of Gujarat v. Mohd. Atik & Others
As affirmed by the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Mohd. Atik & Others, once the common intention of a conspiracy ceases to exist, any subsequent statements made by a former conspirator can no longer be considered as made in furtherance of their shared design.
Specifically, post-arrest statements made by an accused to a police officer—whether confessional or otherwise—detailing their involvement fall entirely outside the scope of Section 8 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam and cannot be used vicariously against co-conspirators.
Mirza Akbar v. Emperor
As established by the Privy Council in the landmark case Mirza Akbar v. Emperor, Section 8 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam operates strictly on the theory of agency, which binds co-conspirators through mutual acts and statements only while the criminal enterprise is actively “on foot” and in the course of carrying out their common intention.
Once the crime is completed, the conspiracy ceases to operate, rendering any subsequent narrative, statement, or post-arrest confession made by a former conspirator inadmissible against co-accused parties.
Because agency and vicarious liability terminate the moment the active design ends, evidence or statements concerning past acts originating outside the active operational period of the conspiracy cannot be received by the court.
Section 9. When facts not otherwise relevant become relevant.
Section 9 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam serves as a broad residuary provision governing the relevancy of facts, establishing that otherwise disconnected facts become admissible if they are directly inconsistent with a fact in issue, or if they independently or collectively render the existence or non-existence of a material fact highly probable or improbable.
While this wide-reaching section accommodates circumstantial pillars such as establishing an alibi or eliminating alternative suspects, it remains subject to the overarching framework and specific constraints of the Adhiniyam.
Consequently, evidence introduced under Section 9—particularly statements made by persons not called as witnesses—must still satisfy all mandatory statutory prerequisites and cannot bypass specific exclusionary rules such as those outlined in Sections 26 and 27.
Bela Rani and others v. Mahabir Singh and others
As established in Bela Rani and others v. Mahabir Singh and others, Section 9 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam cannot be invoked as a catch-all mechanism to admit out-of-court statements or documents from deceased persons that fail to satisfy the rigorous criteria of specific hearsay exceptions under Section 26.
Section 9 is controlled by provisions governing statements of persons who cannot be called as witnesses, distinguishing between the admissibility of material facts and unsworn hearsay statements regarding those facts.
As jurist Sir James Stephen observed, permitting a broad interpretation of Section 9 to admit unverified statements would subvert the statutory framework of Sections 15 through 33, ensuring that casual or unexamined declarations remain inadmissible unless they meet established legal safeguards.
Facts Inconsistent with Any Fact in Issue or Relevant Facts.
Under Clause (1) of Section 9 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, a fact is deemed relevant when it is entirely inconsistent with a fact in issue, meaning both facts are mutually exclusive and cannot co-exist.
As demonstrated by classic examples—such as proving an accused person’s illiteracy when charged with writing a defamatory article, or establishing physical absence—proving an inconsistent fact directly negates the criminal charge.
This principle governs five standard categories of legal defense and evidentiary contradiction: the plea of alibi (proving absence from the crime scene), non-access of a husband, the survival of an alleged deceased victim, commission of the offense by a third party, and self-infliction of harm.
Plea of Alibi - When Can Be Raised & Statements Under Section 180 BNSS.
When an accused raises a plea of alibi, the legal burden rests squarely on them to prove physical absence from the crime scene by leading substantive evidence during the trial, rather than relying on inadmissible police witness statements or affidavits under Section 180 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (formerly Section 161 CrPC).
A plea of alibi cannot be adjudicated for the first time by a High Court under Section 528 BNSS (Section 482 CrPC) jurisdiction.
When evaluating the defense, courts must examine the evidence holistically: while a successfully established alibi mandates an acquittal, even if the defense evidence falls short of absolute proof, it warrants an acquittal if it successfully combines with the prosecution’s evidence to generate a reasonable doubt regarding the accused’s presence at the scene of the crime.
Munshi Prasad and others v. State of Bihar
As established by the Supreme Court in Munshi Prasad and others v. State of Bihar, a plea of alibi requires establishing a physical distance sufficient to render it practically impossible for the accused to have been present at the scene of the crime.
Consequently, a minor separation of 400 to 500 yards—such as attending a nearby panchayat meeting—does not constitute being “elsewhere,” because such a distance does not preclude a person from being at the crime scene.
When timelines and short distances still allow for travel or presence at the occurrence, the defense of alibi fails and cannot be accepted by the court.
Suraj Pal v. State of U.P.
As illustrated in Suraj Pal v. State of U.P., a plea of alibi raised under Section 9 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam must be supported by cogent and unassailable evidence rather than superficial or suspicious documentation.
Although the appellant presented defense witnesses and an official jail visitor entry (Ex. kha 3) to demonstrate he was visiting an under-trial prisoner at District Jail, Fatehgarh at the time of the incident, the court scrutinized the testimony of the defense witnesses and found it lacking in credibility and substance.
Concluding that such evidence was flimsy and failed to exclude the physical possibility of the appellant’s participation at the crime scene, both the High Court and the Supreme Court rejected the alibi, giving precedence to the direct testimony of eye-witnesses.
Vijay Pal v. State (GNCT) Delhi
As affirmed by the Supreme Court in Vijay Pal v. State (GNCT) Delhi, when an accused is convicted on a credible dying declaration corroborated by lower courts, a plea of alibi based merely on cultural traditions or festive visits (such as being away for “Bhaiya Dooj”) cannot succeed unless substantiated by rigorous proof.
The court reiterated that the legal burden resting on the accused to establish an alibi is exceptionally heavy, requiring evidence of such absolute quality that it completely excludes the physical possibility of the accused being at the scene of the crime or generates a genuine reasonable doubt.
Because the defense failed to meet this high threshold of certitude, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of guilt.