Causal Delegation of Authority -

Causal Delegation of Authority

Under the doctrine of casual delegation of authority, a formal or long-term employment contract is not necessary to establish vicarious liability.
When a principal authorizes another person to perform a task for the principal’s benefit, a principal-agent relationship arises, even in a single informal transaction.
As held in Ormrod v. Crosville Motor Service Ltd., a car owner who requested his friend to drive the vehicle for their combined benefit created a casual agency.
Consequently, the owner remained vicariously liable for the friend’s negligent driving committed during the journey.

Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, a master’s liability extends to all torts committed in the course of employment, not merely those expressly authorized.
Applying the Salmond Test, liability arises where the act is an authorized wrongful act or an unauthorized mode of performing an authorized act.
As held by Willes, J. in Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, an employer is liable even for negligence, fraud, or mistaken acts committed while the employee performs the employer’s business, because the employee was placed in a position to carry out that class of acts.

In National Insurance Co., Kanpur v. Yogendra Nath, the court held that acts reasonably incidental to a general instruction fall within the course of employment as an unauthorized mode of performing an authorized act.
Accordingly, the vehicle owner is vicariously liable, and the insurer must indemnify the owner for damage caused during such incidental tasks.
However, where an employee commits a tort entirely outside the assigned duties, the act falls outside the scope of employment, and the master is not vicariously liable.

Under the doctrine governing the fraud of a servant, a master is vicariously liable for fraudulent acts committed by an employee in the course of employment.
Although Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank originally required the fraud to benefit the master, modern jurisprudence has discarded this requirement.
A master is now liable for a servant’s fraud whether or not it was authorized or benefited the employer, because the servant was placed in a position of trust to perform that class of business.

In State Bank of India v. Shyama Devi, the Supreme Court of India held that vicarious liability arises only when an employee’s fraud is committed in the course of employment and in an official capacity.
Where a customer privately entrusts money or cheques to a bank employee as a friend, without following official banking procedures or obtaining a deposit receipt, the employee acts outside the scope of employment.
Consequently, any misappropriation is treated as a private transaction, not an official bank transaction, and the bank is exempt from vicarious liability.

In the law of torts and bailment, Morris v. C.W. Martin & Sons Ltd. (1965) overruled Cheshire v. Bailey, holding that where a master delegates custody of bailed goods to a servant, the servant’s theft is a tort committed in the course of employment.
As Diplock L.J. stated, converting goods while entrusted with their care is an improper mode of performing the master’s business.
However, Salmon L.J. limited this rule by holding that vicarious liability arises only where the servant was entrusted with the goods.
If a servant with no duty or custody over the goods steals them, the act falls outside the scope of employment, and the employer is not vicariously liable.

In the law of torts, Roop Lal v. Union of India established that the absence of a bailment does not automatically exempt an employer from vicarious liability.
Where military jawans stole the plaintiff’s firewood and transported it in official military vehicles for camp fuel, the Union of India was held vicariously liable.
As Bhatt, J. observed, because the jawans were on duty and fuel supply formed part of military administration, the theft was committed in the course of employment, making the employer liable.

Under the doctrine governing the mistake of a servant, an employer is vicariously liable where an employee makes an erroneous or excessive use of implied authority to protect the master’s property.
In Poland v. Parr & Sons, a driver who used excessive force against a boy suspected of stealing sugar caused serious injury.
The court held the employer liable because the servant’s conduct was an unauthorized mode of performing an authorized act within the course of employment, not an independent act outside the scope of authority.

In Bayley v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Ry., the court held that an employer is vicariously liable where a servant commits a tort under a mistake of fact within the course of employment.
A railway porter, believing a passenger was in the wrong carriage, wrongfully removed him while performing his duty.
As Willes, J. stated, when a master delegates a class of duties, the servant is entrusted to decide when and how to perform them.
Accordingly, the master remains liable for mistakes in performance, provided the servant acts in furtherance of employment and not for personal reasons.

Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, a master is liable for a servant’s negligence committed in the course of employment.
Where an employee acts for personal comfort, such as smoking, the court determines whether the act is an independent act or an unauthorized mode of performing an authorized duty.
In Williams v. Jones, a carpenter who negligently lit his pipe while working was held to be acting outside the scope of employment.
However, in Century Insurance Co. v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board, the House of Lords held that a driver who lit a cigarette while unloading petrol committed a negligent mode of performing his assigned duties.
Consequently, the employer was held vicariously liable for the resulting damage.