CAPACITY
The general rule in tort law is that every person has the right to sue and can also be sued.
While the law recognizes this principle of universal legal responsibility, it also provides certain exceptions based on a person’s legal status.
Thus, although everyone is generally entitled to seek legal remedies or be held liable for civil wrongs, this capacity may vary in specific situations recognized by law.
Act of State
The doctrine of Act of State operates as a jurisdictional barrier, preventing municipal courts from adjudicating sovereign executive acts carried out against foreign states or aliens beyond domestic territorial protection.
It does not turn on compliance with internal statutes, but on the principle that such acts belong to the sphere of international statecraft.
The defence applies only when three essentials are met: the act is performed by a state representative, it inflicts injury on a foreign state or its subject, and it carries the government’s prior sanction or subsequent ratification.
Once these elements align, the event is treated as an Act of State, and ordinary civil remedies are barred.
Buron v. Denman
Buron v. Denman established that an unauthorized act becomes an Act of State if it is later ratified by the Government.
Although Captain Denman initially acted without authority, the Government’s approval converted his conduct into a sovereign act.
Therefore, the matter fell outside the jurisdiction of municipal courts, and no civil action for damages could be maintained.
Duff Development Co. Ltd. v. Kelantan Government
The law recognizes that a nation does not lose its sovereign status merely because it depends on another state for certain functions.
 In Duff Development Co. Ltd. v. Kelantan Government, a country may entrust its foreign affairs, defence, or communications to another power without losing its independent legal identity.
Therefore, limited external dependence does not destroy sovereignty, and the state’s official acts continue to enjoy the protection of the Act of State doctrine.
Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Saheba
Secretary of State in Council of India v. Kamachee Boye Saheba established that the annexation of an independent state by a sovereign power is an Act of State.
After the Rajah of Tanjore died without a male heir, the East India Company annexed the state, and the widow challenged the action.
The Court held that the annexation was a sovereign political act, not an ordinary civil wrong.
Since such matters relate to international statecraft and sovereign authority, they lie outside the jurisdiction of municipal courts, and no civil remedy could be granted.
Jahangir v. Secretary of State for India
The doctrine of Act of State provides that there can be no Act of State between a sovereign and its own subjects.
As held in Jahangir v. Secretary of State for India, an Act of State applies only to foreign affairs and relations between sovereign states, not to domestic matters.
Therefore, when the Government acts against its own citizens, it cannot claim sovereign immunity but must justify its actions under the ordinary law of the land, making them subject to judicial review.
Johnstone v. Pedlar
Johnstone v. Pedlar establishes that the Act of State defence cannot be invoked against a resident alien.
Although the Chief Secretary for Ireland ratified the police seizure of an American citizen’s money, the House of Lords held that an alien residing within the jurisdiction is entitled to the same legal protection as a citizen.
Therefore, the Government could not rely on sovereign immunity, and the domestic courts remained competent to order the return of the seized funds.
Hardial Singh v. State of Pepsu
Hardial Singh v. State of Pepsu establishes that after the political merger of a territory, its people become citizens of the new State, and the Act of State defence no longer applies against them.
The Punjab High Court held that once PEPSU merged on 20 August 1948, the residents acquired full citizenship.
Therefore, the Government could not treat the cancellation of the ‘Malwa House’ grant as an Act of State, and its action remained subject to ordinary judicial review.
State of Saurashtra v. Memon Haji Ismail
State of Saurashtra v. Memon Haji Ismail establishes that the validity of the Act of State defence depends strictly on the legal date of territorial annexation, not on public opinion or administrative control.
By merging rigid jurisprudential principles with historical reality, the Supreme Court held that although the Indian administration had taken over the affairs of Junagarh, the State was not formally annexed until 21 January 1949.
Therefore, during the interim period, the inhabitants remained legal aliens to the Dominion of India despite their desire for union.
Since citizenship had not yet legally vested, the administrator’s cancellation of Haji Ismail’s Rs. 30,000 property acquisition was treated as a sovereign Act of State.
Consequently, the Court held that the act was beyond the jurisdiction of municipal courts, and no civil remedy was available.
State of Saurashtra v. Mohammad Abdulla and Others
State of Saurashtra v. Mohammad Abdulla and Others establishes that during the process of territorial acquisition, a state’s de facto administrative control does not automatically amount to de jure sovereignty.
By merging strict legal doctrine with practical reality, the Court held that although the Indian-appointed administrator assumed control of Junagarh in November 1947, the territory was not legally integrated until 20 January 1949.
As explained by Justice Das, the period between physical control and formal legal succession meant that the inhabitants remained legal aliens until the official date of integration.
Consequently, because the Act of State doctrine protects sovereign acts directed against non-citizens in unannexed territories, the administrator’s cancellation of the properties was treated as a valid Act of State, placing it beyond the jurisdiction of municipal courts.
Corporation
The law recognizes a corporation as an artificial legal person, distinct from its members, acting only through its agents and servants under the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Although a corporation has no physical mind or conscience, the law attributes the intentions and actions of its employees to the corporation when they act within the course of employment.
Consequently, a corporation is liable for both ordinary torts, such as negligence and trespass, and intentional torts, including malicious prosecution and fraudulent misrepresentation.
Poulton v. L. & S.W. Ry.
The doctrine of corporate liability distinguishes between intra vires and ultra vires acts in determining a company’s vicarious liability.
A corporation is liable for torts committed within its authorized powers, but not for acts performed outside its statutory authority.
As held in Poulton v. L. & S.W. Ry., the railway company had no legal power to arrest a person for non-payment of horse freight and therefore could not authorize its station-master to do so.
Consequently, an agent’s ultra vires act breaks the chain of vicarious liability, leaving the corporation free from liability.
Minor
Capacity to sue
The law provides that a minor has the same substantive right to sue as an adult, subject only to a procedural limitation.
Although a minor is fully entitled to seek legal redress, they cannot institute proceedings in their own name.
Therefore, the law requires the suit to be filed through a “next friend,” ensuring that the minor’s rights are effectively protected and enforced in court.
Pre-natal injuries
The law governing pre-natal injuries has evolved from common-law uncertainty to a statutory recognition of the unborn child’s rights.
While early courts questioned the duty of care owed to an unborn child, modern laws such as the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act, 1976 recognize a cause of action where a child is born alive with disabilities caused by a tortious act.
The Act also recognizes contributory negligence, contractual waivers, pre-conception injuries, and limited exceptions for maternal liability.
Although India has no specific legislation on this issue, the modern legal approach recognizes a child injured in the womb as entitled to civil compensation upon live birth.
Salient Statutory Features of the 1976 Act:
The child must be born alive but disabled to sustain the action.
Damages for loss of expectation of life require the infant to survive for a minimum threshold of 48 hours post-birth.
The defense of contributory negligence by the parents can be raised to reduce liability.
Liability can be contractually excluded or limited via a pre-existing agreement with the parents.
The scope extends to pre-conception occurrences affecting a parent’s capacity to bear a healthy child, alongside injuries sustained in utero.
An action can exceptionally be maintained against the child’s own mother, restricted solely to instances where the fetal injury resulted from her negligent driving of a motor vehicle.