Effect of Express Prohibition -

Effect of Express Prohibition

Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, an express prohibition by an employer does not automatically place a servant’s wrongful act outside the course of employment.
Even if the servant acts in direct breach of instructions, the employer remains liable where the act is committed while carrying out the master’s business.
A mere prohibition cannot be used by the employer to escape liability.

In Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co., the court held the employer vicariously liable despite an express prohibition against racing or obstructing rival buses.
The driver deliberately blocked a competing omnibus to benefit the employer’s business, causing a collision.
The court ruled that, although the driver acted in breach of instructions, he was still performing the master’s business.
His conduct was an improper mode of driving within the course of employment.
Consequently, the employer remained liable.

In Twine v. Beans Express Ltd., the doctrine of express prohibition was applied to hold that a servant’s forbidden act may fall outside the scope of employment, relieving the employer of vicarious liability.
The employer had expressly prohibited the driver from carrying unauthorized passengers.
When the driver gave a lift to an unauthorized person who was later killed due to his negligent driving, the court held the employer not liable.
Lord Greene held that carrying an unauthorized passenger was a separate act outside the course of employment, so the employer owed no duty of care to that passenger.

In Conway v. George Wimpey & Co. Ltd., the court reaffirmed that an express prohibition may place a servant’s act outside the scope of employment.
The employer had expressly forbidden drivers from carrying non-employees.
When a driver gave a lift to a laborer from another firm, who was later injured due to the driver’s negligence, the court held the employer not vicariously liable.
Carrying an unauthorized passenger was held to be a completely different act, not merely an improper mode of performing the driver’s duties, and therefore outside the course of employment.

In the Position in India, courts have largely departed from the strict English rule in Twine and Conway, favoring vicarious liability where the employer has not issued an express prohibition.
In Mariyam Jusab v. Hematlal, the Gujarat High Court held the State Government vicariously liable after a state-owned water tanker driver gave a lift to an unauthorized stranger who was later killed in an accident.
The court held that in the absence of an express prohibition, giving a lift remained connected with the driver’s employment, making the master liable for compensation.

In Prithi Singh v. Binda Ram, the Punjab & Haryana High Court expanded the scope of vicarious liability by overruling earlier decisions and departing from the Karnataka and Bombay High Courts.
The Court held that when a driver is employed to drive for the master’s business, giving a lift to an unauthorized passenger remains within the course of employment, even if it violates the master’s express orders or the Motor Vehicles Act.
Accordingly, where a truck driver picked up an unauthorized passenger and negligently caused a fatal accident, the truck owner was held vicariously liable, as the primary act of driving furthered the master’s business.

In Premwati v. State of Rajasthan, the court held that an employer is not vicariously liable where an employee completely departs from official duties to pursue a personal errand.
A government driver, after collecting a jeep from a repair workshop, went on an unauthorized joyride, gave lifts to unauthorized persons, and negligently caused a fatal accident.
The court ruled that this was a complete departure from the course of employment.
Since the passengers were trespassers against the State, the State Government owed them no duty of care and was not liable.

In Pushpabai v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co., the Supreme Court of India held that giving a lift to a third party falls within the course of employment where there is no express prohibition and the driver acts under implied or ostensible authority.
A manager, while driving a company vehicle on official business, gave a lift to a co-worker and negligently caused a fatal accident.
The Court held the company vicariously liable, as giving the lift was within the manager’s apparent authority while carrying out the master’s business.

In Young v. Edward Box & Co. Ltd., the court applied the principle of ostensible authority to hold the employer vicariously liable.
The plaintiff was given a lift in the company’s lorry with the joint consent of the driver and foreman and was injured due to the driver’s negligent driving.
The court held that the foreman’s supervisory position gave him apparent authority to permit passengers.
This made the journey within the course of employment, rendering the master liable for the employee’s negligence.