CHAPTER 24 Offences Relating To Religion -

INTRODUCTION

Chapter XV of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, comprising Sections 295 through 298, codifies offences relating to religion based on the dual principles of protecting personal freedom of conscience and prohibiting acts that insult or outrage the religious feelings of any community.

In alignment with India’s secular constitutional framework under Part III, Article 25(1) guarantees the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion to all persons, while remaining subject to restrictions grounded in public order, morality, decency, and health.

Article 25(2) preserves the constitutional validity of Chapter XV, which divides religious offences into three distinct categories: (i) the defilement or injury of places of worship and sacred objects, along with trespassing on burial sites (Sections 295 and 297); (ii) deliberate or malicious acts intended to outrage or wound religious feelings through words, gestures, or publications (Sections 295A and 298); and (iii) the voluntary disturbance of lawful religious assemblies (Section 296).

Offences involving the defilement of places of worship and sacred objects, encompassing two statutory branches: injuring or defiling a place of worship with intent to insult religion, and trespassing on burial grounds.

The core legal element of these offences is the coexistence of a physical act (actus reus)—such as destruction, damage, or pollution of a place or object of veneration—with a specific malicious mental intent (mens rea) to insult the religious beliefs of a class of persons.

Highlighting the volatile nature of such acts, the Law Commission observed that desecration of sacred places is uniquely capable of inciting mass tumult, violent outrage, and armed insurrection, justifying stringent penal consequences.

Consequently, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1958, whenever a place of worship or an object held sacred is intentionally damaged, destroyed, or defiled, a complete offence under Section 295 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is established.

In S. Veerabadran Chettiar v. E.V. Ramaswami Naicker, the Supreme Court, through Justice B.P. Sinha, defined the statutory breadth of the phrase “any object held sacred by any class of persons” under Section 295 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Overturning the lower courts’ narrow construction—which held that a mud figure of God Ganesa broke in public did not constitute a sacred object because it was not consecrated in a temple or carried in a formal procession—the Apex Court held that Section 295 contains no express words of limitation.

The Court ruled that physical or intrinsic monetary value is completely irrelevant; any object, however trivial, comes within the purview of Section 295 if it is regarded as sacred by any class of persons, regardless of whether it has been formally consecrated or subjected to active worship rituals.

Consequently, holy books such as the Bible, Koran, and Guru Granth Sahib, as well as religious idols and symbols, are protected under Section 295 IPC against intentional destruction, damage, or defilement executed with the intent to insult religious feelings.

Under Chapter XV of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 295A and 298 penalize acts that insult or wound religious sentiments, distinguishing between group-level outrages and individual-level affronts.

Section 295A punishes whoever, with a deliberate and malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of any class of Indian citizens, insults or attempts to insult their religion or religious beliefs through spoken or written words, signs, or visible representations, prescribing imprisonment up to three years, a fine, or both.

In contrast, Section 298 focuses on interpersonal interactions, penalizing anyone who, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of a specific person, utters words, makes sounds or gestures, or displays offensive objects in that person’s direct presence and perception, carrying a punishment of imprisonment extending up to one year, a fine, or both.

Section 296 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, safeguards the peaceful exercise of religious practices by penalizing anyone who voluntarily causes disturbance to any assembly lawfully engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies, prescribing a punishment of imprisonment for up to one year, a fine, or both.

Complementing this protection, a landmark 1957 Supreme Court ruling affirmed the constitutional validity of Section 295A IPC, holding that penalizing acts executed with a deliberate and malicious intention to outrage religious feelings is a valid statutory restriction on free speech, as the fundamental freedom of religion remains strictly subject to public order and communal tranquility.

In Ramji Lal Modi v. State of UP, the Supreme Court examined and upheld the constitutional validity of Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, against challenges that it violated the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

The Apex Court ruled that the provision is a valid legislative measure enacted in the interest of public order, noting that it does not criminalize ordinary or casual religious criticisms, but narrowly penalizes aggravated forms of insult perpetrated with a deliberate and malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of any class of citizens.

Furthermore, the Court affirmed that individual freedoms, including religious and expressive rights, are subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the State for the preservation of public order, morality, and health.

In Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2020), Justices A.M. Khanwilkar and Sanjiv Khanna addressed the legal implications of televised speech alleged to outrage religious sentiments and incite communal discord.

Following a television debate where the anchor characterized Sufi saint Pir Hazrat Moinuddin Chishti as an “akranta” (terrorist) and “lootera” (robber) who coerced religious conversions, seven separate First Information Reports (FIRs) were registered against him across Rajasthan, Telangana, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh under Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 298, and 505(2) of the IPC.

While declining the petitioner’s prayer to quash the criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court ruled that public speech carrying communal undertones warrants formal investigation.

Balancing procedural fairness with criminal accountability, the Apex Court invoked its powers to transfer and consolidate all subsequent FIRs into the primary case registered at Dargah, Ajmer (Rajasthan), granted interim protection from arrest subject to active investigation cooperation, and directed state police authorities to provide adequate security measures.